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Over the last decade, the Florida Supreme Court has rendered the
Florida Legislature's carefully crafted long-arm statute virtually use-
less.' And the illogicality of the interpretation of Florida's long-arm stat-
ute continued in the most recent installment, Internet Solutions Corp. v.
Marshall.2 This 2010 decision authorized Florida courts to take personal
jurisdiction over anyone who defames a Florida resident through the
Internet, regardless of whether the defamer was aware of the target's
location.' The plaintiff needs only to show that the website used for
defamation was accessible in Florida and was accessed in Florida.'
Latent in the Florida Supreme Court's long-arm jurisprudence is
one very problematic assumption: that a person who causes harm in
Florida commits an act in Florida, regardless of where he is physically
located.' The Court has used this assumption to circumvent the long-arm
statute's existing provision for capturing out-of-state tortfeasors who
cause harm in Florida.6 This provision needs circumventing because it
includes important checks that limit jurisdiction to those who solicit bus-
* Executive Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2012, University of
Miami School of Law; B.A. 2009, University of Michigan. Thanks to my fianc6, my family, and
my friends for their continued support.
1. See Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1257 (Fla. 2002) (increasing the number of out-
of-state defendants who fall within the long-arm statute); Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji
Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 2000) (holding that due process is more restrictive than the
long-arm statute).
2. 39 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2010).
3. Id. at 1214.
4. Id.
5. See Wendt, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1260 ("[I]n order to 'commit a tortious act' in Florida, a
defendant's physical presence is not required.").
6. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(f) (2010).
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iness in or receive some benefit from Florida.' The Court's cases have
the practical effect of authorizing service over anyone who causes harm
in Florida. This thrusts all of the jurisdictional heavy-lifting onto the due
process clause because plaintiffs who capture defendants under the Mar-
shall interpretation of Florida's long-arm statute can still have their
cases thrown out because of the Constitution's limits on jurisdiction.'
Putting everything on due process is particularly troubling because the
Supreme Court has failed to address personal jurisdiction and the
Internet.9 Because the Florida long-arm has lost any basis in its plain
meaning, the State of Florida and its citizens would be better served by
rejecting the current interpretation of the state's long-arm statute and
returning to something within the limits of due process.
This Note's aims are three-fold. First, it will explain the Florida
Supreme Court's long-arm statute jurisprudence by clarifying the import
of the Marshall decision and showing that the Court relied on flawed
reasoning in reaching that decision. Second, this Note will expose the
defects in the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of its state's long-
arm statute and the unbounded expansion of that doctrine through the
Marshall decision. Finally, this Note will conclude by proposing three
alternatives to the current long-arm jurisprudence, which has gone far
afield of what a long-arm statute is meant to do.
I. THE MARSHALL DECISION
Tabatha Marshall operated a website called tabathamarshall.com,
through which she warned people about consumer-related issues.10 She
posted information on the website, and other consumers could post com-
ments on the same page as the original post." Ms. Marshall's legal trou-
bles began when she posted about a website called VeriResume.12
Internet Solutions Corporation (ISC), a Florida-based company that
managed a number of websites, operated VeriResume." Ms. Marshall
accused VeriResume of operating a "phishing" scam where it stole per-
7. Id.
8. For an extensive discussion on how Florida's long-arm statute and the due process clause
of the Constitution interact to confer personal jurisdiction see Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais,
554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989).
9. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2792-93 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("Because the incident at issue in this case does not implicate modem concerns, . . .
this is an unsuitable vehicle for making broad pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional
rules.").
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sonal information from consumers to be used for identity theft. 4 Natu-
rally, ISC took offense, particularly because the message was read and
commented on by Florida consumers." ISC sued Ms. Marshall for
defamation.16
Significantly, Ms. Marshall operated her website out of her home in
Washington and had only been to Florida one time in her life." The
Florida Supreme Court enumerated Ms. Marshall's dearth of contacts
with Florida:
[S]he had been a resident of Washington since 2000, she had never
been a resident of Florida, she had never owned or leased any real
estate in Florida, she had no bank accounts or investments in Florida,
and she had only visited Florida once-a three-day work-related trip
in 2004 that was unconnected with her website. . . . [S]he was the
owner and host of the website from her home in Washington, had
never sold any products or services in connection with the website,
had never placed any advertisements on the website, had never solic-
ited or received any business, advertising, or donations within Florida
in connection with the website, had never contracted with an Internet
service provider located within Florida, had never provided a capabil-
ity on the website to distinguish or target Florida individuals or com-
panies, had never received any income or compensation in
connection with the website, and had never directed any communica-
tion (telephonic or written) into Florida for business purposes in con-
nection with the website..
So how did Ms. Marshall end up at the Florida Supreme Court? ISC
sued Ms. Marshall in the Federal District Court for the Middle District
of Florida.19 ISC alleged that Ms. Marshall had entered into the State of
Florida to commit a tortious act 2 0 in satisfaction of Florida's long-arm
14. Id. at 1204. Marshall's post was cleverly titled "Something's VeriRotten with
VeriResume . . . ." Id. at 1203. A phishing scam is defined as "a scam by which an e-mail user is
duped into revealing personal or confidential information which the scammer can use illicitly."
Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/phishing (last visited Jan.
22, 2012).
15. Marshall, 39 So. 3d at 1203-04.
16. Id. at 1204.
17. Id. at 1204 n.5.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1204.
20. The relevant provision of the Florida long-arm statute is section 48.193(1)(b) providing:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who
personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection
thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is a natural person, his or her
personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of
action arising from the doing of any of the following acts:
(b) Committing a tortious act within this state.
FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(b) (2010).
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statute.2 1 Because she had no contacts with Florida, Ms. Marshall moved
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 2 2 The district court first rec-
ognized that personal jurisdiction requires two findings: that the defen-
dant falls within the long-arm statute and that taking jurisdiction
comports with due process. 2 3 The district court held that it was bound by
Eleventh Circuit precedent finding that defamatory communications into
Florida satisfied the long-arm statute.24 But the district court held that
granting personal jurisdiction violated Ms. Marshall's due process and
dismissed the case. 25 An appeal by ISC followed.26 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit, like the district court, acknowledged that the personal jurisdiction
inquiry entails an analysis of the long-arm statute and a due process
analysis.27 But unlike the district court, the Eleventh Circuit determined
that there was no settled case law on whether posting on a website was
sufficient to satisfy the long-arm statute.2 8 Lacking controlling state pre-
cedent on the long-arm statute's applicability, the Eleventh Circuit certi-
fied the question to the Florida Supreme Court.29 Oddly, the Eleventh
Circuit withheld any ruling on the due process question until after the
state had ruled on the long-arm statute.3 o
The Florida Supreme Court undertook to answer whether
a nonresident commits a tortious act within Florida for purposes of
the long-arm statute when he or she makes allegedly defamatory
statements about a company with its principal place of business in
Florida by posting those statements on a website, where the website
posts containing the statements are accessible and accessed in
Florida.3 1
The Court disclaimed any ruling on the constitutional due process
inquiry.3 2 In characterizing the separate nature of the two inquiries nec-
21. The Florida Supreme Court may want to reconsider their jurisprudence that a non-resident
"enters into" the state by way of telephonic, written, or electronic communication if those
communications result in harm. This Note argues infra that another provision of the Florida long-
arm statute better captures these tortfeasors.
22. Marshall, 39 So. 3d at 1204.
23. Id. at 1205.
24. Id. (citing Horizon Aggressive Growth, L.P. v. Rothstein-Kass, P.A., 421 F.3d 1162 (11th
Cir. 2005)).
25. Marshall, 39 So. 3d at 1205.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1206.
29. Id.
30. Id. This is odd because the district court had already determined that due process was not
satisfied, so there would be no jurisdiction regardless of the outcome of the certified question. See
Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, No. 6:07-cv-1740-Orl-22KRS, 2008 WL 958136, at *5
(M.D. Fla., April 8, 2008).
31. Marshall, 39 So. 3d at 1206.
32. Id. at 1207.
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essary for personal jurisdiction, the Court said that the long-arm statute
bestows broad jurisdiction on Florida courts, while the Constitution
imposes a more restrictive requirement."
The Court launched into analysis of its cases interpreting the long-
arm statute, and then attempted to fit a website post into the framework
of those cases.34 The Court determined that presence in the state is not
necessary to commit a tortious act in the state." So long as the cause of
action arose out of "the nonresident defendant's telephonic, electronic,
or written communications into Florida," then the long-arm statute was
satisfied.36 The next logical question, then, was whether posting defama-
tion on a website that was accessible in Florida constituted an electronic
communication into Florida."
To answer the question of whether the long-arm statute captured
someone posting on an Internet site, the Court illustrated how the long-
arm statute had been applied in other online contexts." The Court ana-
lyzed a decision by the Fourth District Court of Appeal holding that
disparaging comments on an Internet site fell within the long-arm
because the defendants operated an "interactive web site which [sold]
product to Florida residents."" In Renaissance Health, the defendant
allegedly libeled the plaintiff on its website.4 0 Significantly, the defen-
dant also sold books to Florida residents through the same website.4 1
This decision, the Court noted, hinged on the site's interactivity with
Florida residents.42 The Court recognized that a federal court in Florida
similarly relied on whether a site was "passive" or "active" in determin-
ing satisfaction of the long-arm.4 3 But not every court facing the Florida
long-arm statute and Internet-based suits discussed the passivity or
activity of the website." It suffices to say the Court found that "[a]
review of the relevant case law reveals that courts interpreting Florida
33. Id. (citing Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1257 (Fla. 2002)). This statement sounds,
and is, completely backwards. The reasons will be discussed infra.
34. Marshall, 39 So. 3d at 1207.
35. See id. at 1208 (citing Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1260) ("After reviewing relevant case law,
this Court held that a defendant's physical presence is not necessary to commit a tortious act in
Florida.").
36. Marshall, 39 So. 3d at 1208.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 1210.
39. Id. (citing Renaissance Health Publ'g, LLC v. Resveratrol Partners, LLC, 982 So. 2d 739,
742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
40. Renaissance Health, 982 So. 2d at 741.
4 1. Id.
42. See Marshall, 39 So. 3d at 1210.
43. Id. (citing Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 347 F. Supp. 2d 1242
(M.D. Fla. 2004)).
44. Marshall, 39 So. 3d at 1212 ("Other federal district court cases have discussed the issue
without an analysis of whether the website was 'passive' or 'active.'").
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law in the context of the Web have applied differing approaches."4 5
Some courts required a targeting of or interaction with Florida
residents 46 while other courts found that merely posting information
online was enough to satisfy the long-arm statue.4 7
In an attempt to unite the diverging interpretations, and to answer
the certified question, the Court expounded a new rule for Internet-post-
ing defendants: the defendant commits a tortious act in Florida when it
puts defamatory material about a Florida resident on a website that is
accessible in Florida and that website is, in fact, accessed in Florida.48
The long-arm is satisfied because posting on a website is an electronic
communication into Florida and an electronic communication into Flor-
ida is a tortious act within Florida. 49 The Court applied its new approach
to Tabatha Marshall's allegedly defamatory post, finding that her actions
satisfied Florida's long-arm statute.50 And the Court again emphasized
that its decision regarding the long-arm statute was independent of any
ruling on the due process inquiry of personal jurisdiction.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE MARSHALL DECISION
A. The Florida Supreme Court's Interpretation Makes
Florida an Outlier
The Florida Supreme Court, in Marshall, interpreted its long-arm
statute to confer jurisdiction over defendants who have so few contacts
with Florida, that it is inconceivable how they could ever fall within the
bounds of due process. 52 This interpretation flies in the face of the intent
of the drafters of the original long-arm statutes on which all modern
enumerated-acts long-arm statutes are based." The original purpose of a
long-arm statute was to limit the number of defendants that would be
subject to jurisdiction in a given state to fewer than would be allowed if
45. Id. at 1213.
46. See Renaissance Health, 982 So. 2d at 740 (finding satisfaction of the long-arm statute
where website was interactive and targeted Florida residents).
47. See Richards v. Sen, No. 07-14254-CIV, 2008 WL 4889623 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (finding the
long-arm statute was satisfied where material posted online was accessible in Florida, regardless
of intent).
48. Marshall, 39 So. 3d at 1214.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 1215-16.
51. Id. at 1216.
52. See id. at 1204 n.5 (listing Marshall's dearth of contacts with Florida).
53. See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the
Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REv. 491, 508-11 (2004) (stating that the drafters of the Illinois
and Wisconsin statutes, and the Uniform Act, intended that those statutes limit jurisdiction to well
within the bounds of due process).
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due process were the only limit.54 But the Florida Supreme Court has
turned that notion entirely on its head by finding that the due process
clause is the more restrictive of the two personal jurisdiction inquiries.
In other words, the Florida Supreme Court has taken the Fourteenth
Amendment's framers' vague, aspirational language and made it more
restrictive than the Florida legislature's statute, which enumerates very
specific instances where jurisdiction is appropriate. Such a claim is the
intellectual equivalent of saying that a hypothetical statute specifically
protecting speech in political arenas, speech about public figures, and
speech in academic institutions protects a broader range of speech than
the freedom of speech clause in the First Amendment. The claim in the
hypothetical is ludicrous because of the obviousness that the general
freedom of speech clause in the First Amendment must protect more
than the enumerated statute. So too should it be obvious that "due pro-
cess" captures more defendants than an enumerated-acts statute. But the
Florida Supreme Court fails to grasp such plain logic, casting a fog over
this area of the law in Florida. And this fog will lead to more litigation,
where one could easily argue that it would be malpractice to not contest
jurisdiction given the confusion of the state's highest court.
Florida's long-arm statute already stretched beyond the bounds of
due process, 55 and the decision in Marshall extended it even further.
Such an interpretation wastes courts' and litigants' time. A litigant who
does not satisfy the due process inquiry will never be allowed into court,
so why have a long-arm statute that reaches more people than are
allowed by the due process clause?56 Professor Allyson Haynes accu-
rately summed up the inherent difficulty in the analysis: "[I1n many
instances . . . the application of the long-arm statute is an utterly point-
less exercise in fitting facts within statutory parameters before tossing
that statute aside and getting to the constitutional analysis."5 ' The "utter
pointlessness" referenced by Professor Haynes is compounded in Florida
where the long-arm is an exercise in fitting the defendant under one of
the expansive Florida Supreme Court interpretations, and then throwing
that out and ensuring that the defendant is not barred by due process.
54. See id.
55. See Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 2000)
("ITIhe Due Process Clause . . . imposes a more restrictive requirement.").
56. Many long-arm statutes either expressly go to the limits of due process or have been
interpreted to go to the limits of due process. See McFarland, supra note 53, at 525. A so-called
"enumerated acts" long-arm statute interpreted to extend to the limits of due process is still
somewhat superfluous, but at least it will not capture defendants whose personal jurisdiction is
nonetheless barred by due process.
57. Allyson W. Haynes, The Short Arm of the Law: Simplifying Personal Jurisdiction Over
Virtually Present Defendants, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 133, 163 (2009).
58. Federal courts have muddled the waters even more by considering the long-arm satisfied
2012] 1095
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That the Court's decision in Marshall reinforced Florida's status as
a long-arm statute outlier' 9 only begins to address the problems with the
decision and Florida's long-arm jurisprudence. Indeed, a failure to rec-
ognize the stark differences between web posting and other electronic
communications resulted in the growth of an already-too-expansive
statute.
B. Web Posting is Different From Any Other Electronic
Communication Because It Does Not Require Any
Targeting Whatsoever
The Florida Supreme Court had already veered off course when the
Marshall case came before it.60 But in Marshall, the Court ushered its
long-arm ineptitude into the twenty-first century. The long-arm statute,
which now applies to anyone who posts a message on the Internet, cap-
tures people who certainly would not have been captured under any pre-
vious interpretation.
Take a hypothetical showing the absurdity of the Court's decision
in Marshall. Suppose, in pre-Internet days, a Tennessee resident ate at a
Tennessee Burger Prince restaurant and hated the food. To get back at
Burger Prince, this Tennessee resident took out a full-page ad in his
local Tennessee newspaper falsely claiming that all Burger Prince res-
taurants had rats in their refrigerators. Suppose that a Florida resident on
vacation, unknown to the Tennessee resident, picks up a paper, but does
not read it, on his way back to Florida. Then, once safely within the
confines of Florida, the Florida resident opens up the newspaper and is
appalled at the claims about Burger Prince. Suppose, also, that the Ten-
nessee resident had no other contact with Florida whatsoever and did not
know that Burger Prince was a Florida corporation. Could this Tennes-
sean be haled into a Florida court? While the gut reaction of any reason-
able person should be no, the Florida Supreme Court's decision in
Marshall seems to say yes.
According to the Court, publishing defamatory material outside of
as long as the nonresident causes an injury in Florida. No knowledge is required at all. See
Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 2008). In Marshall, the Florida Supreme
Court expressly refused to rule on the validity of the federal court interpretation. Internet Solutions
Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1206 n.6 (Fla. 2010) ("We do not decide the broader issue of
whether injury alone satisfies [the long-arm statute]. We do recognize that federal courts have
adopted this broad construction . . ., holding that the commission of a tortious act out of state that
causes injury to an in-state resident satisfies Florida's long-arm statute.").
59. See McFarland, supra note 53, at 525 (failing to list any states that have interpreted their
long-arm statutes to extend beyond the limits of due process).
60. The Court first stated that the Florida long-arm cast a wider net than the due process
clause in Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 2000).
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Florida is not enough to satisfy the long-arm statute. 6 ' But as soon as
such material is accessed in Florida, then a tortious act has been com-
mitted in Florida, and it satisfies the long-arm statute.62 Viewing the
current rule outside of its Internet-based context shows how expansive,
and how far beyond the bounds of the Constitution, the Florida long-arm
statute now stretches. Somebody posting defamatory material online (or
in a full-page newspaper ad) unquestionably does something wrong; but
should that action subject them to jurisdiction in Florida, even where he
or she took no purposeful action related to Florida? While the Constitu-
tion's due process clause says no,6 the Florida Supreme Court says
yes.64
Surprisingly, the Court analyzed and then dismissed a targeting
approach that might have corrected the course of its long-arm jurispru-
dence. The Court examined Alternate Energy Corp. v. Redstone,6 5 con-
cluding that the district court based its holding on targeting.6 6 Indeed,
the district court found that the long-arm statute had not been satisfied
because the disparaging remarks about the plaintiff posted on the defen-
dant's blog did not cause more harm in Florida than anywhere else.6 7
The district court compared the case to Wendt, where an out-of-state
attorney's tort targeted his Florida client." But the Florida Supreme
Court rejected Redstone's pragmatic reasoning without explanation,
instead opting for the artificial "accessible and accessed in Florida" test.
Requiring some sort of targeting makes perfect sense when decid-
ing who has committed a tortious act in Florida. Indeed, requiring target-
ing ensures the presence of some scienter where the defendant either
knew where his libelous communications were going or where the per-
son he was libeling was located. Without any type of targeting require-
ment, states can grab virtually anyone who causes harm to any entity
within that state, regardless of the tortfeasor's knowledge of his target.6 9
61. See Marshall, 39 So. 3d at 1203 ("[P]osting defamatory material . . . alone does not
constitute the commission of a tortious act within Florida for purposes of [the Florida long-arm
statute].").
62. See id. ("[T]he material . . . must . . . be accessed in Florida in order to constitute the
commission of the tortious act of defamation within Florida.").
63. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (requiring a finding of minimum
contacts to satisfy due process).
64. See Marshall, 39 So. 3d at 1203.
65. 328 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
66. See Marshall, 39 So. 3d at 1212-13.
67. See Redstone, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 1384 ("[T]here is no indication that Defendant's actions
caused more harm to Plaintiff in Florida than anywhere else.").
68. See id. (citing Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1260 (Fla. 2002)).
69. Federal courts have, in fact, used the expansive interpretation of the long-arm to grab
anyone who causes harm in Florida. See Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1283 (11 th Cir.
2008) (holding that an out-of-state defendant need only cause harm in Florida to satisfy the long-
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Targeting is what separates a person who sent a libelous letter into Flor-
ida from someone who put a libelous message in a bottle in Maine and
had it float to Florida. Surely the Florida Supreme Court did not purport
to assert long-arm jurisdiction over someone who put libelous messages
in a bottle. Such a holding would be laughable, yet that is the state of the
law in Florida.
Such a wide-ranging interpretation of the long-arm statute is partic-
ularly problematic in the age of the Internet. Communications can be
instantly transmitted from any computer to anywhere in the world.
Videos posted to YouTube become instant viral hits and spread around
the globe.7 0 Personal information that used to be private is on display for
the world. And with the touch of a button libelous comments can be
posted to an Internet forum available nationwide. Where communica-
tions can be distributed so widely and so quickly, some check on long-
arm statutes (like targeting) seems essential, yet is totally disregarded by
the Florida Supreme Court.
At least prior holdings of the Court, dealing with other forms of
technology, required some effort by the tortfeasor to get his communica-
tion into Florida, even if he was outside of Florida. In Wendt v.
Horowitz, for example, the tortfeasor was an out-of-state attorney who
made communications into Florida by telephone and mail." But unlike
posting to an online message board, sending a letter requires putting a
Florida address onto an envelope. And making a call into Florida
requires dialing a Florida telephone number. Based on those actions, a
tortfeasor either knows or should know that any resulting harm will be in
Florida.
To do away with any requirement of targeting, replacing it only
with the artificial "accessible and accessed in Florida" language, renders
the long-arm statute applicable to practically any Internet user. Almost
anything on the Internet is "accessible in Florida." And accessing the
material in Florida is a mere formality by the time the communications
have become the subject of litigation. So any purposefulness related to a
particular state no longer matters. All that matters is that the tortfeasor
clicked on the "post" icon and sent his tortious communication out for
consumption on the Internet.
arm statute). But see Marshall, 39 So. 3d at 1206 n.6 (disclaiming any ruling on the validity of
such an expansive interpretation).
70. See, e.g., HDCYT, Charlie Bit My Finger-Again!, YouTUBE (May 22, 2007), http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=_OBIgSz8sSM (showing a home video with over 400 million views).
71. Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1255 (Fla. 2002).
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IHl. SOLUTIONS
A. Use Another Section of the Existing Long-Arm Statute
A conceptual problem with the Florida Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the long-arm in Marshall is that it is difficult to accept that some-
one in Washington, without ever going to Florida, can commit a tortious
act in Florida. The notion that communications into Florida constitute an
act in Florida has survived from previous Florida Supreme Court
cases.7 2 But using the provision that requires a tortious act in Florida is
almost laughable when another provision of the long-arm seems to cap-
ture the exact same tortfeasors and has baked-in checks on the breadth of
the statute; checks that are absent in the "tortious act in Florida"
provision.
Never mentioned in the Marshall opinion is that an alternate provi-
sion of the long-arm statute allows courts to assert personal jurisdiction
over people who "caus[e] injury to persons or property within this state
arising out of an act . . . by the defendant outside this state."" This
provision more precisely captures Tabatha Marshall's actions. She com-
mitted an act outside of Florida that unknowingly caused injury in Flor-
ida. But this provision of the long-arm statute also requires that the
defendant either "was engaged in solicitation or service activities within
this state" or had goods or products that "were used or consumed within
this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use."74 The sec-
ond check acts as a way for manufacturers in products-liability cases to
be captured by the long-arm and is inapplicable to Marshall. But the
requirement that the defendant "engage in solicitation" could be success-
fully applied to Marshall. The only inferential step would be to assume
that Marshall was soliciting Florida readers to her blog. Such a step is
small compared with the imagination required to find that Marshall's
actions actually took place in Florida. Other commentators have
assumed that Internet-based defamation should indeed fall under similar
provisions requiring some sort of revenue or business solicitation."
Furthermore, in the age of Facebook, a revenue or solicitation pro-
vision requires a refusal of jurisdiction over someone who posts some-
thing on a social networking site. Somebody who posts something on
Facebook is not selling anything, is not advertising anything, and proba-
bly does not care who views his page. Such a person might commit
72. See id. at 1260 ("[C]ommitting a tortious act in Florida . . . can occur through the
nonresident defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida.").
73. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(f) (2010).
74. Id.
75. See Haynes, supra note 57, at 170 ("[O]nline defamation would likely fall within the
intentional tort category . . . with its broader revenue requirement.").
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defamation but should not be required to travel to another jurisdiction to
defend himself, and under this regime he would not be required to do so.
The baked-in check of this section of the long-arm statute stands in place
of a targeting requirement.
B. Create an Internet-Specific Provision of the Long-Arm Statute
Professor Haynes has proposed an interesting solution for navigat-
ing the web that long-arm statutes, like Florida's, have become since the
explosion of Internet-based litigation.7 6 Professor Haynes refers to her
proposed solution as a "Short-Arm Statute."" Essentially, the purpose
of the short-arm statute is to stop courts from attempting to fit a round
Internet case into a square long-arm statute and allow states to better
define what Internet-based activity gives rise to jurisdiction.
Haynes' proposal would allow Florida's legislature, not its judici-
ary, to decide when an out-of-state Internet user commits an intentional
tort that gives rise to personal jurisdiction in Florida. One suggested
solution is a mens rea, or targeting, requirement.79 Florida could add a
provision to its long-arm statute requiring an Internet tortfeasor to have
known the location of his defamation target or to have known that the
effect of the defamation would be felt in Florida.s0 Under a mens rea
approach, Marshall would likely have failed because her attacks were
targeted at the company, not at Florida."' Another way to gauge the
severity of intentional torts on the Internet might be the number of times
a defamatory communication reaches a resident of Florida, only
allowing jurisdiction after a critical mass has been reached.82 Under the
quantity approach, Marshall would likely have failed because the plain-
tiff reported only three instances of Florida residents receiving the com-
munications." However the legislature structures it, some safeguard for
Internet-based defendants is better than the vast jurisdiction conferred by
the judiciary in Marshall.8 4
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78. See id. at 168 ("States could better define the type of targeting activity that they envision
giving rise to liability.").
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84. Adding additional provisions to the long-arm statute would also allow the legislature to
deal with other Internet-based litigation like trademark, copyright, and Internet-based commerce.
As the Internet continues to grow at a rapid rate, such litigation will also likely increase. The
legislature and the citizenry will be better off if Internet-based litigation is given its own separate
long-arm provisions, rather than allowing the judiciary to strong-arm new technologies into
existing provisions.
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C. Expand the Long-Arm to Due Process
When a statute becomes as convoluted as Florida's long-arm stat-
ute, rejecting the entire thing must be considered. By finding the long-
arm statute to be broader than due process, the Florida Supreme Court
has shown that the long-arm no longer possesses any of its initial utility.
The original long-arm statutes froze and codified the already-existing
classes of out-of-state defendants that could be granted personal jurisdic-
tion." New technologies and new interpretations have caused the Court
to run afoul of that original purpose. So perhaps Florida would be better
off if it adopted, as many states already have," a long-arm statute that
parallels due process.
A "no-limits" long-arm statute eliminates the two-tiered approach
expounded by the Florida Supreme Court in Venetian Salami Co. v.
Parthenais." No longer would courts and litigants be required to navi-
gate the increasingly complex and irrational long-arm statute, only to
deal with constitutional due process after. The inquiry would be whether
asserting personal jurisdiction violates due process as the United States
Supreme Court has defined it in a fleshed-out series of cases." So long
as jurisdiction complies with due process, then the state authorizes ser-
vice on the defendant. Furthermore, a no-limits long-arm statute maxi-
mizes the amount of protection afforded to state residents.89 No reason
exists to go beyond the maximum protection, as the Court seemed to try
to do with Marshall, and it only makes the litigation process more bur-
densome. In a system that values simplicity and efficiency, a long-arm
statute that limits the personal jurisdiction inquiry to one question
should be given a great deal of consideration.
IV. CONCLUSION
Florida's long-arm statute and the Florida Supreme Court's current
interpretation are extremely convoluted. The statute requires imaginative
inferential leaps to find that a tortfeasor committed a wrong within Flor-
85. See McFarland, supra note 53, at 511 ("All three archetypal statutes were painstakingly
drafted to limit their jurisdictional reach well short of the limits of due process as already
interpreted by court decisions. The statutes looked backward, not forward.").
86. Id. at 528. ("Twenty of the fifty states have long-arm statutes (or court rules) that by their
terms reach to the limits of due process.").
87. 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989) (explaining that courts should look first to the long-arm statute
and then to the due process clause to determine personal jurisdiction). Trusting jurisdiction to
only due process is problematic for reasons discussed infra, but unlike the current approach it is
intellectually honest.
88. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
89. See McFarland, supra note 53, at 534.
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ida. Such an interpretation captures far too many defendants within the
statute. And the difficulties are compounded because the statute is out-
dated and unprepared to deal with new Internet-based tortfeasors.
But all hope is not lost. With relatively simple updates or changes,
the Florida long-arm statute could be brought into the twenty-first cen-
tury. This Note has presented three solutions to the current interpreta-
tion. The Court could begin using a more appropriate section of the
existing long-arm statute to capture defendants who commit their
wrongs outside of Florida. Alternatively, the legislature could update the
statute with additional provisions specifically targeted at Internet-based
defendants. Or the legislature could reject the enumerated-acts long-arm
statute and replace it with a long-arm that authorizes service on any
defendant who falls within the bounds of due process. Any one of these
options would clarify personal jurisdiction in Florida and drastically
reduce litigation over the long-arm statute.
